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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This Court maintains jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court,
and Section 78-2-2 (3) (i) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
This is a response to an appeal from a Summary Judgment Decision
of the Honorable James S. Sawaya of the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County dated October 6, 1986.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This proceeding was commenced when the Appellant filed
this law suit seeking a refund from the Respondents of the sum
of One Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Eight and
6/100

($152,258.61) Dollars, for property taxes which had been

paid to the Respondents under protest.
Motions
parties.

for Summary Judgment were

filed by both

The Respondent's Motion was granted by Judge Sawaya

while the Appellant's Motion was denied.

This Appeal is from

that final Order.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The determinative issue presented by this appeal is
whether certain parcels of real estate, legal title to which is
held in the Utah State Retirement Fund, are exempt from ad
valorem property taxation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Utah Legislature has created, via statute, several

public retirement systems, including separate systems.

The

legislature also created, via statute, the Utah State Retirement
Fund, a trust fund to hold legal title to the funds (49-9-10,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, hereinafter referred by
"Section") and agencies to administer the fund:
State Retirement Office to handle the daily

(1) the Utah

administrative

matters for the trustees and the fund (Section 49-9-2), and (2)
the Utah State Retirement Board to act as the trustee to control
the custody, manage and invest the funds of the Fund (Chapter
74, Laws of Utah 1963, as amended)•
The Trustees are authorized to merge the assets of the
retirement systems for purposes of investment and administrative
efficiency and to prevent unnecessary duplications in administration.

The merged investments of all of the systems are

generally known as the Utah State Retirement Fund (the Fund).
Reserves are generated on behalf of the Fund by
sources such as the towns, cities, counties, school districts,
sewer districts, colleges, universities, libraries and other
"political subdivisions" within the State.

Contributions are

also made by the State as the employer's share of the retirement
cost.

The contributions by the State as an employer, however,

are in actuality additional employee compensation.

Once made,

the employer has lost legal and beneficial ownership of the
contributions as they will not revert to the employer even if
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the employee is terminated before he has any vested rights in
these contributions.

Instead, the contributions made as "add-

itional compensation" on behalf of the employer will remain in
the fund in favor of the remaining beneficiaries.
While the sources of funding described above are
important, the most significant source of funding is the withholding of a percentage of the salary of the employees of each
of the political subdivisions eligible to participate in the
plan.

The funds withheld are contributions by the employees of

their own earnings.

Accordingly, these contributions vest

immediately, and the employee will receive a "refund" should
resignation occur prior to retirement (Section 49-10-6(23)).
The fund is authorized to invest up to 15% of the book
value of the investment portfolio in real estate
49-9-12(1)(m)).

(Section

Pursuant to this authorization, the trustees

have invested trust funds in numerous parcels of real estate.

A

portion of the real estate purchased as an investment may be
leased to individuals who pursue a business conducted for profit
thereon and are thereby subjected to the Privilege Tax (Section
59-13-73) .

This section provides for a tax upon the use of

property otherwise exempt from ad valorem taxation if used "in
connection with a business conducted for profit,...".

Section

59-13-74 provides the amount of the privilege tax "shall be in
the same amount and to the same extent as the ad valorem property tax would be if the possessor or user were the owner

3

thereof."

The parcels of real estate used in a manner that

generates the privilege tax are not the parcels of real estate
that have generated the controversy of which this suit is the
subject.
(The statutes relating to the Utah State Retirement
Systems and to ad valorem taxation have been recodified by the
1987 Utah State Legislature.

The recodified statutes have been

renumbered and are similar to the statutes at issue in the
instant case.

All references contained herein are to the former

statutes as numbered prior to their recodification since those
statutes are controlling for the tax year in issue.)
In May of 1985, the Respondents threatened to sell at
tax sale, real properties, the legal title to which were held by
the Appellant.

Appellant paid, under protest, the sum of One

Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Eight and 61/100
($152,258.61) Dollars, for property taxes.

Appellant filed this

law suit seeking a refund from the Respondents of the taxes paid
under protest.
parties.

Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by both

The Respondent's Motion was granted by Judge Sawaya

while the Motion of the Appellants was denied.

This Appeal is

from that final order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 31st day of May, 1983, the Utah State Tax
Commission determined that certain vacant land located within

4

Utah County and held in the name of the Utah State Retirement
Fund was exempt from taxation as properties owned by a state
agency.
Brief.)

(T-00051-00053.)

(See also addendum to Appellant's

Thereafter, on the 29th day of April, 1985, the Utah

State Tax Commission determined that property held in the name
of the Utah State Retirement Fund and located within Salt Lake
County did not belong to a State Agency or Political Subdivision
of the State of Utah and was not therefore exempt from taxation
thereby sustaining the determination of the County Board of
Equalization of Salt Lake County that the property in the name
of the Fund was taxable.

(T-00015 - T-00020.)

A complete copy

of said decision is set forth in the addendum to Respondent's
Brief.
Based upon the decision of the Tax Commission, Salt
Lake County proceeded to tax Appellant's property.

Appellant

thereafter filed a complaint against Salt Lake County which was
ultimately decided in favor of Salt Lake County and against
Appellant on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.
T-70-71.)
trial

(T-35-54 and

Respondent seeks affirmance of the decision of the

court

in granting

judgment

to

Respondent

thereby

sustaining the taxability of properties held in the name of the
Utah State Retirement Fund.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS (OUTLINE)
I.

The Fund (as opposed to the Utah State Retirement Office or
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the Utah State Retirement Board) is not an agency or
political subdivision of the State, and therefore does not
qualify for the exemption from ad valorem taxation provided
by Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah State Constitution
or Section 59-2-1, the statute that operates to implement
the relevant constitutional provision.
II.

Notwithstanding the conclusion with respect to I. above,
the real estate that is the subject of this case is not
exempt from ad valorem taxation because it is not property
"of" the State, county, etc.
A.

Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, and
Section 59-2-1 both provide as a condition to exemption that before real estate may be exempted from
ad valorem taxation it must be "property of" the State
(or county, city, etc.)

B.

The criterion on which exemptions are based in Utah is
ownership rather than use.

C.

The real estate subject to the ad valorem taxation
that is the subject of this suit is not "property of
the State" as intended by the drafters of the relevant
provisions.

D.

The presumption in general is that exemptions from ad
valorem taxation are to be strictly construed.
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This

presumption is particularly strong in the case of
property owned by a non-public body.
III. To exempt the real estate from taxation would provide for
discrimination without a rational basis.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FUND (AS OPPOSED TO THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT
OFFICE OR THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD) IS NOT AN
AGENCY OR POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE, AND
THEREFORE DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR THE EXEMPTION FROM AD
VALOREM TAXATION PROVIDED BY ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 2
OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, OR SECTION 59-2-1, THE
STATUTE THAT OPERATES TO IMPLEMENT THE RELEVANT
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION.
The Board argues that both the Board and the Fund are
to be considered State Agencies by claiming that the Fund is not
a separate legal entity and thus is indistinguishable from the
agencies charged with its administration.

However, for the

following reasons, the Fund is in fact a separate entity that
does not qualify as a State Agency.
First, the Fund is organized by a separate statute
rather than as part of the statute creating the Board.

Had the

Fund been intended to be indistinguishable from the Board or
otherwise had been intended to be considered a part of an
amalgamated group of conglomerated organizations, it would have
been created by the statute creating the amalgamated group.
Second, Utah Code Annotated, Section 49-10-8, creating
the Fund, specifically provides for it as a separate entity by
establishing it as a "trust fund."
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The Statute speaks of the

Fund as a separate entity by providing for a separate trustee
and in general dealing with the Fund as an entity onto itself.
Thirdly, the purpose in providing for the Fund as an
independent trust fund was to establish between the Fund and the
Board the legal relationships normally found in a trust.

This

arrangement separates the Fund from the trustees, the effect of
this is that although the Fund is administered by a state agency
it should not itself be considered as such.
supported by two cases.

This conclusion is

In Chez v. The Industrial Commission of

Utah, 62 P. 2d 549, the Utah Supreme Court addressed an issue
with regard to the State Insurance Fund which provides workmans
compensation insurance for employers and is administered by the
State, and stated:
"The employer really pools his premiums in the State
Fund to create a fund for the payment of an obligation
for which it is liable. It is a common fund belonging
to the participating employers. It is therefore not
derived from anything owing to the state nor paid out
on behalf of any state obligation.
...The Fund is publically administered, but its
debtors are not debtors to the state. It belongs, not
to the state, but to the contributing employers for
their mutual benefit.
...Owing to the fact that we have concluded that the
State Insurance Fund, while a public fund in the sense
of being administered by a public body, it is not
public money in the sense that it is money of the
state to be used for and on behalf of the state for
state expenditure."
The principle being espoused is that assets of a fund
which is administered by the state but funded through private
contributions to address a private responsibility, are not
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property of the state.

It also describes the important dis-

tinction between a fund established for the benefit of certain
non-public interests and the public body which administers the
fund as trustee, and thus recognizes the application of the
legal principles described by trust law to the relationship
between a trust fund and its public trustee/administrator.
In Chez, the Court indicates that the insurance fund
was in the nature of a private business, and that administration
or even participation by the state did not transform the fund
into state property.

The fact that the State administers the

fund does not transform the fund into a responsibility of the
state or the citizens thereof.

The Court concluded that if the

insurance fund were liquidated, the assets would be returned to
the contributing businesses.

Similarly, if the Retirement Fund

in the instant case were to be liquidated, the assets would be
distributed first to the beneficiaries with vested rights and to
the employee contributors.
It may be argued that Chez is distinguishable from the
instant case because the state did not make regular contributions to the insurance fund (except for those which covered its
own liability as an employer) that was part of the issue in that
case, while in this case regular contributions are made by the
state to the Retirement Fund.

However, this is a distinction

without a difference since the state contributions to the
Retirement Fund do not belong to the state; they are simply

9

compensation in addition to the employees salary in which the
employee may obtain vested rights at a later date, but in any
case will not return to the state but will remain part of the
Fund for the benefit of remaining employees should an employee
resign before their rights have vested in the employer (state)
portion of the contribution.
The conclusion to be derived from an application of
the principles expressed above to the instant case is that the
Utah State Retirement Fund, like the insurance fund described in
Chez, is an entity separate and apart from the state agency
empowered with its administration.

And, as a separate entity,

it may not somehow be characterized as a "public body" merely
because the body empowered with the administrative function may
qualify as a "public body."
The conclusion that the legal relationships described
by trust law apply to a trust fund as the "res" owned by a party
other than the public trustee also finds support in the conclusion of the Attorney General in his decision cited by the Utah
Supreme Court in Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General v. Utah
State Retirement Board and Utah State Retirement Fund, et al.,
652 P.2d 1332 which states:
In a formal opinion, no. 78-007, the Attorney General
has ruled that the Retirement Fund was not a state
fund but rather a public trust fund and that as such
the fiduciary responsibilities of the Board "would be
in conflict with control exercised by the state
auditor or other public official."
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The Attorney General defined the fund correctly and
this definition was acknowledged by the Utah Supreme Court.

The

Attorney General defined the retirement fund as a "public trust
fund", the property of which does not belong to the state or the
government.
Fund.

The Fund is not a State Fund; it is a Public Trust

A public trust is a legal term which is correctly defined

in Duchesne as a trust in which the beneficiary is not a definite or ascertainable being, such as defining a class of
individuals without identifying the definite identities which
may change.

A private trust on the contrary, is one in which

the beneficiaries are absolutely identified and in whom the
beneficial ownership is absolutely vested.

The Board uses the

term "Public Trust" in an incorrect manner.

The choice of

"Public" as a modifier for "Trust" does not impart a reference
to a state or government owned entity as the term is commonly
used.

The Court in Hansen, supra, acknowledges this on page

1338 by stating that the Retirement Fund is administered "solely
for the benefit of the beneficiaries and not for the public at
large."
The only concrete authority in support of the claim
that the Fund (versus the Board) is an independent state agency
is a phrase cited in the Boardfs memorandum from Hansen, supra,
at page 1340 wherein the Court refers to the Fund as "a quasi-state fund; ..."

It is submitted that this is an incorrect

characterization of the Fund.

It should initially be noted that
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this characterization is inconsistent with other opinions of the
Court cited in this brief, a prime example being Chez, supra.
The characterization of the Fund as "a quasi-state
fund" also appears inconsistent with the characterization of the
Fund in other segments of Hansen, supra, itself.

It is submit-

ted that the intent behind the use of the phrase "quasi-state
fund" was to indicate that the Fund is affiliated with the state
because it is state administered.

However, the Court also

recognized, by the use of the modifier "quasi" that the fund is
not to be considered as a state agency, and does not benefit
from this characterization.

It is also submitted that the use

of the term "quasi-state fund" was intended to indicate that
status of the Fund was similar to the insurance fund described
in Chez.

This interpretation would appear to be consistent with

the intent expressed in the body of the Hansen opinion and
reconcile with the intent expressed in Chez.

And, finally,

perhaps the characterization of the Fund as "quasi" is appropriate, describing the state administration of a (public) trust
fund owned by unascertained individuals as a group and without
any state ownership, yet providing an important distinction in
that the Fund does not qualify as a state agency, and thereby
does not derive any of the benefits nor assume any of the
burdens associated with agencies of the state.
The conclusion that the Fund is not a state agency is
further

supported

by

an

examination
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of

the

fiduciary

relationship that exists between a trustee and the beneficiaries
of a trust.

Generally, a trustee must administer the trust

solely for the benefit of the trust and beneficiaries.

The

trustee owes an undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries and must
protect and preserve the trust.
P.2d 181 (Utah).

See Sundquist v. Sundquist, 6 39

It is possible that the trustee of the Fund,

the Board, will be required to protect the assets of the trust
in favor of the beneficiaries; i.e., the retired and vested
state employees in conflict with asserted interests of the
State.

If the fund is considered a state agency or state fund,

the trustee—an alleged independent state agency—would be put
in an impermissible conflict of interest since the state agency
would have a fiduciary duty to protect the
itself—the

State.

fund against

Thus, the legal relationships between a

trust, the trustee and

the beneficiary,

intended

by the

legislature in creating the Fund are inconsistent with the
proposition that the Fund is a state agency, and therefore the
conclusion to be drawn is the agency is not a "state agency."
In sum, an examination of each of the aforementioned
arguments supports a conclusion that the Fund is not a state
agency.

When examined as a whole, one is left with the

inescapable conclusion that not only is the Fund not a state
agency, but it was never so intended.
POINT II
NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONCLUSION WITH RESPECT TO I,
ABOVE, THE REAL ESTATE THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS
CASE IS NOT EXEMPT FROM AD VALOREM TAXATION BECAUSE IT
IS NOT PROPERTY "OF" THE STATE, COUNTY, ETC.
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In

Point

II, the

County

will

show

that,

notwithstanding an adverse conclusion with respect to Point I,
the real estate that is the subject of this suit does not
qualify for exemption from ad valorem taxation because it is not
"owned" by a body whose real estate is eligible for exemption
from taxation.
A.

The criterion on which exemptions of property owned by
a governmental body are based in Utah is ownership
rather than use.
Providing exemptions

from ad valorem taxation for

certain properties owned by governmental bodies is a universal
practice throughout the United States.

See 3 A.L.R. 1439.

In

providing these exemptions, however, the states are split on the
basis to be used in determining the properties to be granted
such an exemption.

3 A.L.R. 1439.

In one group of states, property ownership is the
criterion used to determine which properties will be granted
exemption from ad valorem taxatin
"ownership" states).

(referred to hereafter as

Conforming with these states, the Utah

Supreme Court declared in City of Springville v. Johnson, 37
P.522 (Utah 1894) that all property owned by the State of Utah
was exempt notwithstanding its non-public use.

Thus, in Utah,

the determinative criterion is ownership rather than use.
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Accordingly, ownership is the primary issue in Point II of this
brief.
The other group of states grants exemptions

for

properties devoted to public uses (referred to hereinafter as
"use" states).

In these states, the determinative criterion is

the purpose to which the property is being put.

Thus, in these

states, it is possible to have property owned by a governmental
body subject to ad valorem taxation if it is not devoted to
public use; e.g., Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. County of
Fulton, 171 A.2d 882.
The Board relies heavily on two cases (Commonwealth v.
Dauphin County, et al., 6 A.2d 870, 335 Pa. 177, and State
Teachers Retirement Board v. Board of Tax Appeals, 177 Ohio
Street, 61, 202 N.E. 2d 418) in which the taxability of property
of the respective State Retirement Systems were at issue.

In

both cases, exemptions were granted with respect to the real
property that was the source of the controversy.

At first

glance, it would appear that these cases are on point.

However,

on closer examination this is not the case.
The primary reason these cases are inapplicable is
that they are both decided in States in which the criterion used
to determine the exempt status is the purpose for which the
property is used (use states).

The reason this makes the cases

inapplicable is that the analysis used to arrive at a conclusion
is entirely different in use states than the analysis used in

15

ownership states, and therefore inapplicable in states, such as
Utah, in which the issue centers around ownership.

In both

cases, the constitutions and implementing statutes indicated
that property tax exemptions would be permitted only for real
estate used for public purposes (see Dauphin County, supra, at
page 8 73) .
Thus, in both cases the analysis used by the court is
to determine whether the property that was the source of the
suit was used for public purposes.

The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court in Dauphin County, supra, viewed the issue as follows:
"The resulting issue is whether the fund of the
Retirement System is property used for a public
purpose of the Commonwealth, and whether the real
estate here involved is being held by it as a
properly acquired part of that fund, rather than
as a private business enterprise."
Thus, the thrust of inquiry in these

cases—the

determination of the purpose to which the property is being
put—proceeds along an entirely different line of analysis than
is required in an ownership state.

A prime example of the

difference in the source of inquiry to be pursued is found in
decisions from the State of Kansas.

In City of Harper v. Fink,

148 Kan. 278, 80 P.2d 1080, the Kansas Supreme Court interpreted
the relevant constitutional and statutory authority to require
an analysis based upon the ownership of property.

In that case,

the court examines the various aspects of ownership to determine
whether exemptions were to be granted.
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However, in 1963, the relevant statutes were amended
to change the determinative criterion on which exemptions were
granted from ownership to use.

Accordingly, in Arkansas City,

v. The Board of County Commissioners of Sumner County, 197 Kan.
728, 420 P.2d 1016, the Kansas Supreme Court recognized the
effect the amendment had in the analysis used to determine
whether an exemption was to be granted.

The court indicates

that ownership, and the factors used to determine ownership, are
now irrelevant.

Instead, the important factor is use, and the

court proceeds to examine whether the property in question is
used for a public purpose.
Thus, the factors examined in a "use" state to determine whether property is exempt from taxation, such as whether
the property is held for governmental or proprietary reasons, or
the underlying reasons for the existence of the body holding
title to the property in question (e.g., Dauphin County, supra.), or whether the property is used in a manner consistent
with the expressed purpose behind the organization of the body
claiming the exemption

(e.g., Pennsylvania Turnpike, supra.),

are irrelevant in a state, such as Utah, in which the criterion
is the ownership of property.

Because the criterion used is

different, the factors used in making the decision are different
(e.g., whether the existence of a retirement system constitutes
a "public purpose" via the need to retain quality teachers and
therefore improve the public school system, or that exemption
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from taxes will reduce the payments needed from the state to
conserve the fund and thus exemption is in itself a "public
purpose." or, as the Utah Supreme Court unequivocally acknowledged, that the State Retirement Fund benefits the beneficiaries
individually by providing for their retirement and does not
inure to the benefit of the state.

Robert B. Hansen v. Utah

State Retirement Board, 652 P. 2d 1332
1338) .

(Utah, 1982) at page

As a result, both of the cases (in addition, Common-

wealth v. Schuylkill County, 62 A.2d 922, which is cited and is
also irrelevant for the same reason) and the statements therefrom relied on by the Board are irrelevant to the determination
of whether an exemption is to be granted in the instant case.
It is noted that on page 29 of their brief, the Board
indicates that every other state that has ruled on the issue of
tax exemptions on the real properties of governmental retirement
systems has held those properties to be exempt from ad valorem
property taxes.

We would like to submit that State Teachers

Retirement Board v. Kinney, 68 Ohio St.2d 195, 429 N.E.2d 1069,
although a decision in a "use" state, which , as indicated
above, provides limited guidance, holds that real property
comprising a parking lot owned by the State Teachers Retirement
Board was not used for a public purpose, and therefore was not
exempt from taxation.
B.

Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, and
Section

59-2-1

both provide
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as a condition

to

exemption that before real estate may be exempted from
ad valorem taxation it must be "property of" the State
(or county, city, etc.).
Having determined

that Utah is an ownership

state, the

issue is to determine who owns the property in question.

The

first step in answering this question is to examine what is
required

for ownership.

The source of the determinative lan-

guage is Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, as
amended effective January 1, 1983, which provides in pertinent
part as follows:
1.

All tangible property in the state, not exempt under
the laws of the United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in
proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided
by law.

2.

The following are property tax exemptions:
(a)

The property of the state, school districts, and
public libraries;

(b)

The property of counties, cities, towns, special
districts, and all other political subdivisions
of the state, except that to the extent and in
the manner provided by the Legislature property
of a county, city, town, special district or
other political subdivision of the state located
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined
by law may be subject to the ad valorem property
tax;

Utah Code, Section 5 9-2-1, implementing the aforementioned
section of the Utah Constitution provides in pertinent part as
follows:
1.

The following property is exempt from taxation;
(a)

The property of the state, school districts, and
public libraries;
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(b)

property exempt under the laws of the United
States, the property of counties, cities, towns,
special districts, and all other political
subdivisions of the state;

The relevant language of both the Constitutional provision and
the statute is the phrase "...property of ..."
C.

The real estate subject to the ad valorem

taxation

that is the subject of this suit is not "property of
the State" as intended by the drafters of the relevant
provisions.
In Hoover Equipment Company v. The Board of Tax Roll
Corrections of Adair County, 436 P.2d 645 (Oklahoma 1967) and
State of Oklahoma v. Dunbar, 618 P.2d 900 (Oklahoma 1980), in
which the issue was the ownership of certain properties for
purposes of exemption from ad valorem taxation, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma interpreted the same language to mean "owned
by" the body in question, and stated the determinative factor
thus to be ownership.
Thus, the real issue is what constitutes ownership.
In addressing the question of ownership, the court in Hoover,
supra., indicates that "...when a state statute ... requires
property to be assessed against its owner, "...it means the
general and beneficial owner—the person whose interest is
primarily one of possession and enjoyment...and not the person
who retains the legal title...."."

The Oklahoma Supreme Court

elaborated in Dunbar, supra, where it stated that "...we find
the fact that legal title to the properties in the case at bar
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is in [the name of the Respondents] is not in itself determinative of the tax exemption under the "property of" portion of
Section 6.

The determinative factor is "ownership."

The Court

then summarized this proposition by stating that to determine
ownership" ...we must determine the quantum of interest which
[the Respondents] have in the properties."
The Wyoming Supreme Court also addressed the issue in
State v. Underwood, 85 P.2d

707

(Wyoming, 1939), where an

exemption was claimed based upon the fact that legal title was
held by the state in trust for the benefit of an individual, by
quoting 61 C.J. 366 that (see also 84 C.J.S. 386):
"the public property which is thus immune from taxation includes all property...which legally or equitably belongs wholly to the state, no matter on what
basis its title rests. But the immunity extends only
to such property as may properly be said to belong to
the state and it is not sufficient that the state may
have some indirect...interest therein. In 61 C.J. it
is stated that "property held by the state as trustee
for others is not exempt.""
The concept of "ownership" of property held in trust
has been addressed

in numerous cases.

In People ex rel

Olmstead, County Collector v. University of Illinois, 159 N.E.
811,

(Illinois, 1928) the Illinois Supreme Court held that

property held in trust by a state university for the benefit of
certain student groups was not tax exempt.

In addressing this

question, the court states:
...the Rule is to be deduced that ownership of property in the state, such as exempts that property from
taxation, must be exclusive and free from any kind of
legal or equitable interest in any one else. If the

21

state holds property as trustee, not for the public,
but for the benefit of specified private persons, such
property cannot be said to belong to the state so as
to exempt it from taxation. It seems clear that the
state does not have exclusive ownership of the property involved,
...It further appears in the application of this test
that, acting as trustee, the state through the Board
of Trustees of the University, does not hold the
property in trust for the public, but that a certain
class of specified private persons are the only ones
to receive beneficial interest therefrom. The State
cannot, therefore, be said to own the property to the
exclusion of any legal or equitable interest in any
one else.
This was also addressed in St. Louis v. Wenneker, 47
S.W. 105 (Missouri, 1898) wherein the Missouri Supreme Court
held that property devised to the city in trust for a relief
fund for emigrants was not exempt from taxation.

The Court

states:
"We think that the property of a county or city
exempted from taxation by the constitutional provision
herein before quoted is that of which such county or
city is the beneficial owner which is held by it "for
its own use" and not merely in trust. It does not
include that in which the only interest of the municipality is as trustee."
This was reaffirmed in State ex rel. City of Saint
Louis v. Bauman, Collector of Revenue 153 S.W. 2d 31, (Missouri,
1941) wherein the court stated that the term "property" must, as
a necessity, include both equitable as well as legal interests
and that state ownership of property that is exempt is construed
to comprehend both equitable and legal ownership.
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In State v. Board of Commissioners of Beadle County,
53 S.D. 609, 222 N.W. 583, the South Dakota Supreme Court states
that
"it is undoubtedly true that a provision exempting
state owned property from taxation will not be held to
exempt property to which the state holds mere legal
title under circumstances such that the real beneficial interest is in third persons."
The Utah Supreme Court signaled its approval of this
concept of ownership in Duchesne County v. State Tax Commission,
104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335.

However, while the holding in that

case appears initially to support the position of the Appellant,
in fact the result was based upon the application of the principle that only state owned property is exempt, which, when
applied to the facts in the instant case yield a result that
will favor the respondent.
Duchesne

is in

The determinative issue addressed in

fact similar

to the issue addressed in

Springville v. Johnson, supra.; whether property owned by the
State is subject to taxation if the property is used for a
proprietary rather than governmental purpose.

In Duchesne, the

state was a trustee for land held in trust for the State School
Fund.

Both the trustee and the beneficiary qualified for tax

exempt status, and therefore the issue of whether property
qualified for an exemption had the beneficiary been a non-exempt
party was not addressed.
The County argued that the fund property was subject
to taxation because the state had acted in a proprietary manner

23

inconsistent with its governmental nature and therefore inconsistent with the reasons supporting exemption; to whit, the fund
acquired property as a result of a business venture and foreclosed property held by private parties in satisfaction of loans
extended by the fund.

The County also argued that the ex-

emptions applied to property held and used

for the public

generally and not to property used for specific purposes such as
an express trust (the fact that the beneficiaries of the trust
were tax exempt school districts was not addressed).

The court

discussed the historical evolution of the notions of "propriety"
and "governmental" functions, and in so doing addressed and
reaffirmed Springville v. Johnson by indicating that all property owned by the state is exempt regardless of the fact that
private persons may benefit from the property or the uses to
which it is put, proprietary or governmental.

The Board mis-

places the trust of the quotations cited from Duchesne.

For

example, the following quota by Justice Wade from Duchesne, when
read in conjunction with the fact that the trustee and the
beneficiary were both entities enjoying the benefits of exemption from ad valorem taxation, addresses the ownership issue:
"I concur in the result on the grounds that this is
the kind of property that was intended under our
constitution and statutory provision to be exempt from
taxation, it being in trust for the benefit of
schools, and it is immaterial whether it is held in a
governmental or proprietary capacity, and whether it
was once subject to taxation or not."
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This and other quotations in fact provide additional
support for the principle that all property owned by the state
is exempt notwithstanding its use.
to the instant case.

This issue is not pertinent

Instead, the County asserts that real

estate, the ownership of which belongs to a group that does not
benefit from exemption from ad valorem taxes, is subject to
taxation.
The Board also misplaces its reliance on New York
State Teachers Retirement System v. Srogi, 84 A.D. 912, 447
N.Y.S. 2d 57, a case similar to Duchesne that at first appears
on point.

The issue there was whether property acquired pursu-

ant to the foreclosure of a mortgage was exempt.
found it was.

The court

However, the issue in the instant case is whether

real estate is subject to ad valorem taxation because it is
owned by non-exempt beneficiaries while legal title is held by a
trust fund.
An assimilation of these cases leads to the conclusion
that (1) legal title does not equal "ownership" as the term is
used with respect to property tax exemptions; (2) ownership
generally means the beneficial owner, the person whose interest
is primarily one of possession and enjoyment and (3) the concept
of ownership is represented by certain rights or interests in a
property.

The Oklahoma court in Dunbar summarized this proposi-

tion by stating that to determine ownership" ...we must determine the quantum of interest which [the respondents] have in the
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properties."

The American Restatement of the Law, Trusts 2d,

Section 2 pg. 7, confirms this in connection with property held
in trust where it states:

"The term "property" denotes inter-

ests in things and not the things themselves."

Thus, the

interests in property may be divided among legal title, beneficial interest and possession; all own certain interests in the
same property and yet terming any one an "owner" is incorrect
without further explanation.

However, the broad term "owner" is

often used and usually refers to the person who owns the beneficial interest.

This definition of ownership is the one adopted

by the Restatement.
Applying these principles to the facts presented in
the instant case leads to the conclusion that the beneficiaries
are the "owners" of the Fund, and thus the underlying real
estate.

The interests of the state are as follows:
The Utah State Retirement Office handles the daily
administrative matters for the trustees and the fund;
The Utah State Retirement Board acts as the trustee to
control the custody, manage and invest the funds of
the Fund;
Assuming, only for the purpose of argument, that the
Fund is considered an "agency" of the state, then
legal title to the property is also an interest held
by the state;

However, the beneficiaries have the following interests:
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Since the employee's contribution is "vested" at the
time of contribution, he is an equitable owner of his
pro-rata share of the Fund.

His "bundle of rights"

described by the retirement laws and contract may be
summarized as an equitable beneficiary of a trust—an
owner of property.

Re: Skinner, 230 Iowa 1016, 300 NW

1.
Those employees with vested rights maintain at all
times the rights to a "Refund" of an amount that
represents the vested portion;
The Fund as a whole belongs to the Beneficiaries whose
rights have vested.

The parties with vested rights

have an absolute right to the proceeds, which is one
of the premier rights subject to assertion.

Thus, the

beneficiaries with vested rights are the absolute
owners of the Fund.

Driggs v. Utah State Teacher

Retirement Board, 142 P.2d 657 (Utah, 1943).
In conjunction with the right of "Refund," the beneficiaries have the most significant interest that one
may obtain—the risk of loss; for absent a culpable
act by the trustee, the beneficiaries are ultimately
at risk should the economic fortunes of the trust turn
irrevocably into decline;
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When the quantum of interests are compared, it is
obvious that the beneficiaries are, under the aforementioned
criterion, the "owners" of the fund.

It is noted that neither

party is ordinarily entitled to another of the most significant
interests—the right to possession, and therefore is an irrelevant factor.

Therefore, since the beneficiaries are the owners

of the Fund, the section of the Utah Constitution and the
implementing statute do not apply to the real estate that is the
subject of this suit, leading to the conclusion that the properties are subject to taxation.
D.

The presumption in general is that exemptions from ad
valorem taxation are to be strictly construed. This
presumption is particularly strong in the case of
property owned by a non-public body.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that all

property, of whatever nature, is taxed unless
granted an exemption.

Exemptions

specifically

from taxation are to be

narrowly construed and any doubt concerning whether or not the
property will be granted an exemption must be resolved in favor
of taxation.

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly dismissed

the legislature's attempts to expand the application of exemptions by relying on the constitutional mandate that all
property is taxed at its proportionate share for the support and
maintenance of the government.

See Good Shepherd Lutheran

Church v. State Tax Commission, 54 P.2d 630 (Utah, 1976); Great
Salt Lake Mineral and Chemical Corp. v. State Tax Commission,
573 P.2d 337 (Utah, 1977).
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In Salt Lake Lodge No, 85, B.P.O.E. v. Groesbeck, 120
P.2d 192 (Utah, 1911), the Utah Supreme Court indicated that the
reason for the existence of exemptions is that by exempting the
property specified in the constitution, the state is presumed to
receive benefits from the exempted property equivalent at least
to the public revenue that would otherwise be derived therefrom.
However, in the instant case, the property subject to the claim
for exemption benefits only a class of private citizen-beneficiaries by providing for the retirement of government employees.
The Utah Supreme Court in Hansen unequivocally acknowledged that
the State Retirement

Fund

inures to the benefit of the

beneficiaries individually by providing for their retirement and
does not inure to the benefit of the state.
Therefore, since the beneficiaries are the owners of
the Funds, the presumption in favor of taxation must apply, and
therefore the section of the Utah Constitution and the implementing statute do not apply to the real estate that is the
subject of this suit, leading to the conclusion that the properties are subject to taxation.

POINT III
TO EXEMPT THE REAL ESTATE FROM TAXATION WOULD
PROVIDE FOR DISCRIMINATION WITHOUT A RATIONAL
BASIS.
The State of Utah, as an employer, has established
a retirement plan for its employees.
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The retirement plan is

provided in addition to other employee benefits such as
salary, life insurance, and health insurance.

The State is

in a situation similar to non-public employers with respect
to plan requirements.

It is submitted

that providing

exemptions to a retirement fund administered by the state
while retirement funds, not state administered do not enjoy
this benefit, violates

the constitutionally

guaranteed

principle of equal protection.
The Legislature maintains the power to distinguish
between different classes which may be accorded inconsistent
benefits or burdens as long as such distinction is supported
by a rational basis.

However, equal protection protects

against discrimination within a class; the law must be
applied equally to those similarly situated.
The nature of the Fund as an enterprise comparable
to non-public funds finds support in State tax Commission v.
Department of Finance, 576 P.2d (Utah, 1978).

Although this

case involved the State Insurance Fund, the principles are
applicable as the nature of the insurance fund is almost
identical to the Fund.

The assets of the Fund exist solely

to cover obligations identical to those of a non-publically
administered retirement fund.

The Fund has the same admin-

istrative costs as a non-publically administered retirement
fund.

The Fund does not benefit a different class of

citizens than does a non-publically administered retirement
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fund.

The only distinguishable

feature is that it is

administered by a public organization.
The Utah Supreme Court discusses, in detail, the
private aspects of the State Insurance Fund on page 1298 of
State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, supra.

The

Court held that even though the insurance fund was administered by a state agency, it was basically identical to a
private insurance fund and could not be accorded preferential treatment.

The assets of the insurance fund exist only

to cover the identical obligation covered by private insurers, that it had the same administrative costs as private
insurers, and that it was self-supporting

in that its

expenses were paid by the contributors rather than governmental appropriation.

The Court indicated that the only

distinguishing feature was that the fund was administered by
the state.

The Court held that the administration of a fund

by a state agency is not a sufficient rational basis to
distinguish the fund and treat it differently from other
private insurers.
This being the case, it is submitted that providing an exemption for property in which the state holds legal
title as the trustee to the Fund while non-public funds fail
to enjoy the benefit of tax exemption with respect to their
real estate holdings is a violation of equal protection

31

since it irrationally discriminates against these non-public
funds.

POINT IV
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED.
The County takes the position that the Motion of
Summary Judgment was properly granted.

The granting of the

Motion was obviously made on the basis that as a matter of
law, the real estate was not entitled to an exemption.

In

addition, the stipulation of facts was more than adequate in
light of the nature of the controversy.

There is no dispute

as to the facts surrounding the controversy, merely a
disagreement as to the application of the law to the facts.
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that findings and conclusions are unnecessary on decisions
of motions

for summary

judgment.

The Court correctly

concluded that, under Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, even if the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the losing party, the Respondents were entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
Therefore, it is the position of the County that
the Motion for Summary Judgment was properly granted.

CONCLUSION
The discussion shows that:
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THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY DECIDED:
1.

Although the Appellant

is an entity created by

statute, it cannot be clearly identified as a state agency or
political subdivision.
2.

The

property

tax

assessment

asserted

by

the

espondent against certain property owned by the Appellant is
treby affirmed.
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I certify that I mailed
Decision of Informal Hearing to:

a
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the

foregoing

G. Blaine Davis. Esq.
Morgan. Scalley & Davis
50 South Main Street. Suite 500
Salt Lake City. UT
84144
Bill Thomas Peters. Esq.
Special Deputy County Attrorney
9 Exchange Place. Suite 1000
Salt Lake City. UT
84111
David Vanier
Salt Lake County Auditor
72 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City. UT
84111
Milton Yorganson
Salt Lake County Assessor
City and County Building
Salt Lake City. UT
84111
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